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The Slavic-Orthodox Community in Azerbaijan: The Identity and Social 
Position of a Once-Dominant Minority
Bruno De Cordier, Ghent
Abstract
Based on recent empirical findings and field observations, this article examines the Slavic-Orthodox com-
munity in Azerbaijan. Nowadays numbering about one and a half percent of the population, the main threat 
to its continuity is not persecution nor pressure to assimilate, but an ageing ethnic-demographic base which 
is not going to be kept up to level by either natural replacement or new adherents. Orthodox Christianity 
will nonetheless keep a presence in the country, yet its base of adherents will unavoidably become more het-
erogeneous.
Social Geography in Historical Perspective
Within the official contours of Azerbaijan, Slavic Ortho-
dox Christians form the largest Christian minority in the 
country alongside the adherents of the Armenian Apos-
tolic Church. Since the latter are nowadays mainly con-
centrated in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, they are cut 
off from the country’s wider society however. Often col-
loquially called ‘the Russians’, the Slavic-Orthodox com-
munity, now around one and a half percent of the popu-
lation, basically consists of three ethnic-social categories 
the limits between which are often fluid. First, of course, 
there are the citizens of Slavic background, more specifi-
cally Azerbaijan’s some 140,000 ethnic Russians including 
some 1,500 of Cossack ancestry, Ukrainians, and Belarus-
sians, among all of whom a form of Orthodox Christianity 
is historically and at least nominally part of their ethno-
cultural identity. Second come the 3,000 or so Molokans. 
Although officially, these are usually considered Russians, 
their distinctive identity and lifestyle centered around 
a sixteenth-century breakaway sect of Orthodox Chris-
tianity—reminiscent somehow of an Orthodox version 
of the Quakers—and a presence in the country that pre-
dates that of most of Azerbaijan’s present-day Slavic groups, 
mean that they are locally often seen as a separate group.
And third, there are the people of mixed Slavic-Azer-
baijani origin who identify to one or another degree with 
Orthodox Christianity and who are also often counted in 
censuses as Russians. What these have in common is the 
use of Russian as their primary language.1 By far the larg-
est portion of the country’s Orthodox Slavs, and here we 
talk about around ninety percent, nowadays live in Baku 
and within a radius of thirty kilometers around the city. 
Beyond that, there are much smaller Slavic communities in 
Ganja, Mingaçevir as well as in rural districts like Ismaili 
1 This also includes ethnic Ukrainians and Belarussians who 
designate their respective national languages as their mother 
tongue in censuses and surveys, but who use Russian in everyday 
practice partly due to a lack of a critical mass of speakers of their 
national language in their surroundings.
(where the majority of the Molokans live), Xaçmaz (where 
there is a concentration of people of Belarussian and Cos-
sack origin), Lenkoran and also some districts along the 
Azerbaijani–Georgian border. They do not form a major-
ity in any district. Figure 1 on p. 6 below offers a histor-
ical overview of the shifting demographic share of Slavs 
(Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) in Azerbaijan 
between 1897 and the last national population census 
in 2009. As one can see, this minority’s present popula-
tion share is a fraction of previous levels including that of 
1989. Historically, Azerbaijan’s Orthodox Slavic commu-
nity consists of several layers.
The permanent Orthodox Slav presence in what is now 
Azerbaijan goes back as far and the 1795–1826 period, 
when Cossacks and religious dissidents like the Molo-
kans settled in the Mugan steppe and along the southern 
Caspian coast. Later, from 1860 onwards, an increasing 
number of Slavic peasant communities came into being 
in what were then the Baku and Elisabethpol governor-
ates.2 The industrialization drives which came with the 
first Baku oil boom (1870–90, up to 1910) and with the 
economic modernization and social transformation that 
took place in the Azerbaijani SSR (1930–60) formed fur-
ther major channels of Slavic settlement in the country 
up to a zenith of more than 17 percent of the popula-
tion in the year 1939. This gradually decreased due to 
higher birth rates among the majority groups and reset-
tlement moratoriums after 1959, yet the most dramatic 
plunge came after 1989. The ethnically Orthodox Slavs, 
as a dominant minority in the republic, were not specifi-
cally targeted during the heavy political turmoil preced-
ing and following independence in summer 1991.3 The 
2 For a more detailed account, see Sudaba Zeinalova (Судаба Зей-
налова), ‘Этнодемографические изменения на Кавказе: фор-
мирование европейских этнических общин (XIX –начало 
XX вв.)’, Кавказ и глобализация, 3(4), 2009: 108–121.
3 Between early 1988 and autumn 1993, the Azerbaijani SSR and 
independent Azerbaijan were affected by communal unrest in and 
around Baku and the 1990 Black January crackdown, the Nagorno-
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disintegration of a USSR with which they strongly iden-
tified, the perspective of long-term chaos, and the rapid 
decline of the industries and social institutions in which 
they were economically active, were, however, perceived 
to be an existential threat.
The subsequent mass exodus which followed now 
seems to be more or less stabilized. In fact, 58 percent of 
the respondents declared not to want to leave Azerbaijan 
at all, while 3.7 percent decided to do so for good and 11.7 
percent was in doubt. Either case, the community that 
remains today has a number of protruding social char-
acteristics. First, although there are officially no separate 
population pyramids for minorities in Azerbaijan, obser-
vations and interaction with the community under exami-
nation as well as local academic sources suggest that, due to 
both the emigration of a sizeable part of its younger strata 
after 1988–93 and smaller families than those among 
Azerbaijan’s Muslim majority, perhaps up to two-thirds 
of this community is over forty. Slightly over 28 percent 
in our research declared to be pensioners, which is more 
than double the national average.4 In turn, this top-heavy 
age structure explains, be it in part, the second characteris-
tic, namely the disproportional portion of women as com-
pared to that in the general, national population pyramid.
Here again, observation and interaction, as well as 
some literature sources, suggest that up to two-thirds of 
the Orthodox Slav population in Azerbaijan is female, 
which is again in sharp contrast to the national average 
which shows a slight surplus of men.5 Other explanatory 
factors related to the latter are, first, the higher longevity 
among women and, second, the number of women of Slav 
origin who came to Azerbaijan or stayed there after 1988–
93 because of a mixed marriage, often concluded during 
the latter USSR era, with an Azerbaijani husband. Among 
our respondents, 23.3 percent declared to belong to this 
category. As a matter of fact, both of these social charac-
teristics of the Orthodox community were quite visible 
to this author when he observed how the audience of lit-
urgies and the active parishioners in Baku and Xaçmaz 
were overwhelmingly female and over fifty.
Karabakh War, a secession attempt in the south, and finally a fac-
tional coup in Ganja.
4 The survey was conducted among 300 respondents in Baku, 
Sumgait and Ganja in autumn 2015. For details on Azerbaijan’s 
demographics, see The World Bank, ‘Azerbaijan’s demographic 
change. Implications for social policy and poverty’, Human Devel-
opment Sector Unit, South Caucasus Country Department, 
№63155-AZ, 2011: 17.
5 Silvia Serrano, ‘Les Russes du Caucase du Sud: du malheur d’avoir 
un empire (et de le perdre)’, Revue d’études comparatives Est-
Ouest, 39, 2008, №1: 127 and Christophe Guilmoto, ‘La masculi-
nisation des naissances. État des lieux et des connaissances’, Popu-
lation, 70(2), 2015: 201–202.
Third, in terms of social position and occupation, 
besides a disproportionally large portion of pensioners, 
23.7 percent of the respondents declared to be active in the 
private sector or self-employed and 16.3 percent declared 
to work in technical or so-called liberal professions. Rus-
sian companies and educational institutions and faculties 
where Russian is the language of instruction form specific 
employment niches, while Molokans are predominantly 
active in agriculture to an extent that some of their prod-
ucts lately obtained some sort of branding status as ecolog-
ically pure food. Finally, although some Orthodox Slavs do 
work for government institutions, their presence in that 
sphere is limited. This is due, first, to the requirement of 
fluency in Azerbaijani and, second and more importantly, 
because they have fewer connections among the patron-
age networks that are necessary to obtain positions in the 
state bureaucracy.6
Current Identity Characteristics
As one can see in Figure 2 on p. 7, an insignificant share 
of the respondents in our research identify themselves 
primarily in terms of their traditional faith, that is, as an 
Orthodox Christian. The majority consider themselves in 
the first place to be either Russian, Azerbaijani citizen of 
Russian origin or of mixed Slavic-Azerbaijani background. 
Again, the Molokans form an exception since the commu-
nal identity that sets them apart from Russians in general 
is defined in terms of faith. At the same time, three-quar-
ters of the respondents declared to be followers of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. So, 
although active religiosity and regular practicing are defi-
nitely low in this community—3.7% said that they attend 
church on a weekly basis or more, 10.3 non-regularly and 
37.3 percent occasionally, that is on major holidays or for 
life rituals—adherence to Orthodoxy is considered by 
many to be an essential part of a larger Russian identity, 
along with the Russian language and a strong association 
with the Russian greater space.
Belonging to the latter is defined, first of all, by the 
Russian language. Second, there are the predominantly 
positive to very positive memories of the USSR, preva-
lent among 63 percent of the respondents, either through 
direct personal experience, idealized memories or inter-
generational lore. Third, there are the ties and interac-
tion with relatives in Russia which 45.3 percent report to 
have. And fourth, there is the influence of information 
channels from Russia which 44 percent declared to have 
as their main source of information. Slightly over 90 per-
cent has a very or rather positive view of Russia as a coun-
6 In a de facto arrangement of representation of ethnic and religious 
minorities, the Slavic-Orthodox community has one representa-
tive in the national parliament, who seats for the presidential party.
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try and society and 64.7 percent strongly support a close 
association if not union between Azerbaijan and Russia.7 
A further characteristic in the identity pattern of Baku’s 
Slavic community is, that a sizeable part sees itself, as does 
the Russianized Azerbaijani intelligentsia, as a component 
of a long-standing, multi-ethnic Baku identity. This iden-
tity is felt to be under threat with the departure of a large 
portion of the minorities and of Slavs and Armenians after 
1988–91 in particular and the arrival of IDPs from Nago-
rno-Karabakh and internal migrants from the provinces.
Even if the near-disappearance of the Russian language 
from the public sphere and the predominance of the Azer-
baijani language, which now 53 percent pretends to speak 
and write fluently or rather well and 41.7 percent in a lim-
ited way, remain issues, there is little perception among 
Orthodox Slavs that they are persecuted, or under pres-
sure to culturally assimilate or to convert to either Shia 
or Sunni Islam. As Figure 3 on p. 7 reflects, the main 
societal challenges and threats identified by the Ortho-
dox Slavs, not seldomly on the basis of personal confir-
mation in everyday life, are similar to those that gener-
ally come forward when one asks the same question to 
the Muslim majority population of Azerbaijan: unem-
ployment, corruption including economic monopolies, 
the state of health care and education and, perhaps sur-
prisingly to some, the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
especially because of the potential that the conflict may 
flare up again.8
Interestingly, one-sixth of the population of interest 
said that it followed other churches. This basically includes 
two categories. First, there are those who belong to other 
eastern churches, like Ukrainian Greek Catholics, Geor-
gian Orthodox and followers of the Udi-Albanian Church, 
who turn to Orthodox parishes because their own denom-
ination has no institutions or clergy in the place where they 
7 In terms of very positive to rather positive views, Russia is followed 
by Georgia with 79.6 percent and Turkey with 73 percent which 
is surprisingly close to attitudes towards Turkey among Azerbai-
jani opinion in general. The survey was taken before the downing 
of a Russian warplane by the Turkish air force near Yamadi on the 
Syrian–Turkish border though. So it is not clear whether this has 
starkly affected public attitudes among the Slavic minority vis-à-
vis Turkey, as it did in Russia itself.
8 One opinion that came up several times during the conversations 
was, that Slavs were also negatively affected by the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh War, more specifically the Molokan villages in the area which 
were shelled (some of the inhabitants of which now live near Baku) 
and Stepanakert’s small Slavic-Orthodox population which had to 
flee during the hostilities. Despite the assistance by Russian units 
or at least individual commanders to Armenian separatists at the 
time, only 2.6% of our respondents felt that Orthodox Slavs are 
perceived as pro-Armenian. A joint 65 percent of those questioned 
have a rather or very negative feeling vis-à-vis Armenia as a state.
live.9 And second, and more importantly, there are the 
adherents of the various Protestant and charismatic-Pente-
costal denominations who came to Azerbaijan during the 
1990s. Due to a number of circumstances and sociological 
reasons, they clearly attracted some following among the 
Slav minority and among métis in urban areas. Although 
their activity and growth seems to have stabilized if not 
stagnated in the recent 7 or 8 years, the Orthodox epar-
chy of Baku actively watches Protestant and Pentecostal 
groups. Individual priests also told me that countering 
the influence of non-traditional sects among the histori-
cally Orthodox population remains one of the tasks and 
raisons d’être of their ecclesiastical work.10
The Slavic-Orthodox and the Azerbaijani 
State
Since 2011, after the eparchy of Baku and the Cis-Caspian 
which encompassed Azerbaijan and Dagestan was reorga-
nized, the Orthodox church in the country reports under 
the eparchy of Baku which is only responsible for Azer-
baijan.11 Headed since 1999 by Archbishop Alexander, 
a native of Yaroslavl who served in North Ossetia before, 
the Orthodox church has six registered cathedral churches 
and one chapel in the country. Four of these parishes are in 
Baku, one in Sumgait and one each in Ganja and Xaçmaz. 
A new parish is planned to be set up in the southern Cas-
pian town of Lenkoran in 2016 or 2017. Inversely propor-
tional to much of the followers’ base—and compared to 
their Roman Catholic counterparts in Western Europe—
the Orthodox clergy, which country-wide had some 30 
ordained priests at the time of this research, is predomi-
nantly young, generally in its early thirties to mid-forties. 
Most of the priests are Azerbaijani citizens and have been 
trained, for lack of a seminary in Azerbaijan itself, at theo-
logical colleges in Saratov and Stavropol.
Rather than evangelizing, the Orthodox church’s 
claimed mission is to support its existing historical com-
munity and to preserve the ancient Christian heritage in 
9 Founded in 488, the Apostolic Church of Caucasian Albania, 
which has some 3,800 adherents, primarily among the Udi minor-
ity in Gabala, is the oldest surviving and officially recognized 
church in present-day Azerbaijan.
10 This actually fits into a historical pattern in which the Orthodox 
hierarchy in Moscow and the eparchy of the Trans-Caucasus con-
sidered the establishment of parishes among the Slavic settlers vital 
to counter the influence of schismatic Orthodox sects and Bap-
tism. Fuad Agayev (Фуад Агаев), ‘Строительство православ-
ных церквей в рамках переселенческой политики царизма в 
северном Азербайджане в конце XIX – начале XX вв.’, Bakı 
Universitetinin Xǝbǝrlǝri, №2, 2012: 153
11 An eparchy is the Orthodox equivalent of a diocese in Roman 
Catholicism. Officially, the eparchy of Baku and the Cis-Caspian 
which was founded in 1998, was reorganized and split-up for practi-
cal-organizational reasons. The government’s unease toward supra-
national confessional entities might also have played though.
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Azerbaijan. As per survey results, 9 percent among the 
Orthodox Slavic community, its main social base, seem 
to have a high level of trust in the church and its clergy. 
Although in the minority, this is far superior to the shares, 
amounting to an average of about one percent, who allot 
a high level of trust to political parties, local as well as 
international NGOs, and to judicial courts for example. 
An additional 23 percent has a rather high level of trust, 
36 percent has a neutral stance, and a  joint 24 percent 
a rather low level or no trust in the clergy and the church 
at all. Only a  limited portion, slightly less than 7 per-
cent, consider the Orthodox church to be an intermedi-
ary between themselves, the state and other ethnic-con-
fessional communities.
Besides ecclesiastical work, through its social wing, it is 
involved in a number of charitable activities. Its clergy and 
volunteers thus organize administrative help, food pack-
ages and the facilitation of medical support for isolated 
pensioners, the ill and marginalized households. Other 
social activities include Sunday schools, the organization 
of ‘open tables’ on major Orthodox holidays like Easter, 
Trinity Sunday, Orthodox Christmas, the Epiphany and 
the Old New Year, and the organization of courses in 
the Azerbaijani language to promote bilingualism. Offi-
cially, the eparchy of Baku and its parishes and clergy are 
not funded by either the Moscow Patriarchate or the Rus-
sian government. They mainly depend on various kinds 
of private donations, elite philanthropy, in-kind support 
like the free availability of real estate, the return on own 
investments, a favorable fiscal regime and exemptions of 
payment for utilities.
The Orthodox church, in line with the official, secu-
lar community organizations and national-cultural cen-
ters, clearly keeps a  legitimist stance vis-à-vis the state, 
the incumbent oligarchies and in the political realm in 
general, whereas among the grassroots, there is a  rela-
tive acquiescence and political disengagement if not cyn-
icism toward the latter. Both attitude patterns are not 
necessarily a reflection of ideological or personal sympa-
thy with the current power elites. It rather reflects that 
these, shaped and partly Russianized as they were in the 
mold of the USSR and its policies of indigenization of the 
communist structures, are seen to embody some continu-
ity with the USSR.12 There is also a rather strong feeling, 
reinvigorated more recently by the psychological impact 
of the war in southeastern Ukraine and the predicament 
of Assyrian and Coptic Christians in crisis areas in the 
Arab sphere, that for all its ills, the secularist regime and 
the stability that it is seen to bring, at least leave room 
for the survival of an Orthodox Christian community 
12 Viatcheslav Avioutskii, ‘Les clans en Azerbaïdjan’, Le Courrier des 
pays de l'Est, 2007/5 №1063: 67–79.
in the country. Lastly, the presence and maintenance of 
an Orthodox community is an important element in the 
Azerbaijani government’s diplomacy with Russia of course 
but also with Serbia and Belarus, and in its efforts to keep 
up the image of religious tolerance that is lately promoted 
in the regime’s international public relations.
Concluding Remarks
Due to its size and population share, the Slavic-Orthodox 
community in Azerbaijan represents a paradigm quite dif-
ferent form that in, say, Latvia and Kazakhstan, where 
Orthodox Slavs form up to a quarter of the population. 
This is too small to form a real voting bloc or a base for 
a communal political movement. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 4 on p. 8, in the current conditions and despite its 
near-insignificant population share, Azerbaijan’s Slavic-
Orthodox community, especially in Baku where the crit-
ical mass of active Russian speakers remains much larger 
than in Ganja, for instance, feels that it can somehow suf-
ficiently preserve its individuality. For its preservation, it 
moves in a space defined by a long historical presence in 
the country dating back generations, by the opportuni-
ties created during the years of economic growth, and by 
the modalities and conditions created by the official inter-
pretation and practice of secularism and inter-ethnic and 
religious tolerance.
The presence of traditional eastern Christianity is 
not resented among Azerbaijan’s Shia and Sunni Mus-
lim majority, contrary to the activities of non-traditional 
Christian currents like Pentecostalism who also prosely-
tize among Muslims. Also, Slavs are not popularly seen 
to be particularly privileged nor to control certain sec-
tors of the economy or economic monopolies. And the 
fact that there is no Slavic concentration in a geographic 
area bordering Russia means that they are not considered 
potentially separatist or a threat to national unity either. 
The main existential threat to the Slavic population and 
hence Russian Orthodoxy in the country nowadays, is 
not persecution nor pressure to convert to the majority 
faith. It is an ageing ethnic-demographic base which is 
not going to be adequately replaced, especially not out-
side of Baku, by either natural replacement or new fol-
lowers. One of the factors that retains its acceptance by 
the majority culture, that it does not actively try to gain 
converts or reverts beyond its traditional Slavic following, 
thus stunts its future presence in the country.
As for the Molokans, it remains to be seen whether 
the group can perpetuate its endogamous social order 
without compromising its identity. Russian Orthodoxy 
will not disappear. Even if in the future, Islam, moreover 
Shiism, could, and likely will, play a stronger role in both 
society and governance, this should not be an impediment 
for the perpetuation of an Orthodox community in the 
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country. But its base will unavoidably become more het-
erogeneous if it is to perpetuate itself, not only consisting 
of the numerically smaller segments of younger Slavs, but 
also of expatriate Russians, of people of mixed origin or 
unclear ethnic-confessional identity—who might even 
become its most active adherents and advocates—and of 
adherents of smaller traditional-Christian groups which 
could be absorbed.
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Figure 1: The Evolution of the Number and Percentage of the Population of Slavs in Azerbaijan 
Between 1897 and 2009
1897* 1926** 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009
Total number (persons) 95,736 241,653 553,433 531,344 544,148 506,439 432,482 170,700 143,800
Slavic-Orthodox population share
(%) 5.6 10.6 17.3 14.3 10.6 8.4 6.2 2.1 1.6
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Source: table created by the author on the bases of statistics from Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. 
Распределение населения по родному языку и уездам Российской Империи кроме губерний Европейской России, Бакин-
ская губерния, Елизаветпольская губерния, Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения 
по регионам республик СССР, Закавказская СФСР ‒ Азербайджанская ССР, Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 (1959, 
1970, 1979, 1989) года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР, Азербайджанская ССР, Demoscope, <www.
demoscope.ru>, and the population censuses of 1999 and 2009, Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Statistika Komitəsi (State Statistical 
Committee of Azerbaijan), <www.stat.gov.az>.
*Figures for the governorates of Baku and Elisabethpol, whose joint territory more or less encompassed that of present-day Azerbaijan. The 
figures comprise what was then called Greater Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians) and Belarussians.
**Situation for the Azerbaijani SSR of the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic.
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Figure 2: Primary Self-Identification Among the Slavic-Orthodox in Azerbaijan
160 (53.33%)
69 (23%)
49 (16.33%)
14 (4.7%)
4 (1.32%)
2 (0.66%)
1 (0.33%)
1 (0.33%)
0 50 100 150 200
Russian
Azerbaijani citizen of Russian origin
Of mixed Azerbaijni-Slavic origin ('métis')
Ukrainian
Belarussian
Russian speaker
Orthodox Christian
Other ('cosmopolitan')
Figure 3: Main Challenges and Threats Affecting Azerbaijani Society, Including the Slavic-
Orthodox Minority
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Source: extracts from the results of the author’s opinion survey, autumn 2015
Source: extracts from the results of the author’s opinion survey, autumn 2015
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Figure 4: Can the Slavic-Orthodox Community Preserve its Ethnic and Confessional Identity 
in Azerbaijan?
Yes, to a sufficient 
level
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Source: extracts from the results of the author’s opinion survey, autumn 2015
The Identity of the Caucasian Yezidi in the Wake of the Sinjar Tragedy
Allan Kaval, Erbil
Abstract
This article compares the social and identity development of the Yezidi communities in the southern Cau-
casus and in Iraq. It argues that since the 1990s, a Yezidi national identity that, first, borrows a number of 
elements from Armenia’s national-commemorative narrative and that, second, could take advantage of the 
relative opening of borders and of modern information and communication technologies has developed 
among the Caucasian Yezidi. With the old Yezidi core areas in northern Iraq under existential threat by 
armed conflict and displacement, this identity could become the new framework in which a modern Yezidi 
identity will be able to sustain itself.
Who, in Fact, Are the Yezidi?
In summer 2014, the spate of atrocities by the Islamic Sate 
against Yezidi villagers and townspeople in the northern 
Iraqi district of Sinjar brought previously never seen inter-
national attention to this peculiar community and cul-
ture.1 Nonetheless, the Yezidi’s ordeal, which was the sub-
1 The original of this article was written in French and was trans-
lated by Bruno De Cordier.
ject of media coverage for a while, did not really result in 
a better understanding of their history, confessional prac-
tices and their identity dynamics. On the contrary, the 
Yezidi, who tend to be associated exclusively with their 
ethnographic area in Iraq while omitting the Caucasian 
Yezidi, are often reduced to mere victims—the role they 
had when much of international public first came to know 
about their existence. Also, through the persecutions and 
atrocities of which they are the target, they are supposed 
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to illustrate the ruthlessness and inhumanity of Islamic 
State, without being envisaged differently than in relation 
to their persecutors or to the crimes of the latter.
Beyond the inconsolable trauma that it brought upon 
the Yezidi from this area itself, the Sinjar massacres also 
strongly affected the wider Yezidi world. Scattered, frag-
mented but nonetheless more and more connected these 
days, the different poles that exist within the transna-
tional Yezidi sphere tend to increasingly define themselves 
in relation to one another, after having followed parallel 
but unrelated ways in the run of the twentieth century. 
This is the case, for example, among the Yezidi of Arme-
nia, a country which houses the bulk of the Yezidi within 
the realm the old USSR. As heirs of an identity construc-
tion first connected to the USSR before being radically dis-
rupted by the union’s demise, the Yezidi of Armenia now 
take part in the construction of a globalized Yezidi iden-
tity in which the memory of Sinjar could likely become 
a key element.
The Yezidi who live in Armenia and other parts of 
the southern Caucasus belong to a confessional commu-
nity that is rooted in the heart of the Kurdish world, but 
that was scattered following recurring persecutions, the 
redefining of borders following the First World War, the 
dismantling of the Ottoman empire and establishment 
of the Turkish republic and of new Arab nation-states, 
and the founding of the USSR. Kurdish but not Muslim, 
the Yezidi are historically figuring as a minority within 
a minority, which often results in double-marginalization 
sealed by a reputation that they are devil worshippers. This 
old fallacious (but tenacious) idea has long made them 
a target of regular persecution by their Muslim neighbors, 
as well as a fascinating curiosity for Orientalists. At the 
heart is a religious system which comprises elements of dif-
ferent gnostic traditions and in which the Peacock Angel 
(Tawûsê Melek in Kurdish, Malik al-Tawus in Arabic), is 
the central figure. Being the most powerful of the seven 
angels to whom, in Yezidi tradition, God entrusted the 
guardianship of world affairs, the Peacock Angel is often 
considered, in Islamic folk beliefs and in the accounts 
of certain over-hasty external observers, to be the Fallen 
Angel, the devil.2
Membership of the Yezidi community is based on 
genealogy and is hereditary. The Yezdi’s religious practice 
is defined by a large set of alimentary and other taboos, 
rules and obligations, life rituals and seasonal celebrations. 
This normative system is associated with a social hierar-
chy which contains three main ‘castes’—pir, sheikh and 
murid—and a number of sub-castes that have a heredi-
tary and endogamous character and distinct social and 
2 Christine Allison (2001), The Yezidi oral tradition in Iraqi Kurd-
istan, London : Curzon Press.
religious functions. The transmission of religious knowl-
edge is essentially oral and happens through sacred chants, 
hymns and eposes, who are carriers of the community’s 
collective memory.3
The importance of oral transmission in Yezidi tradi-
tion makes the study of the origins of the Yezidi and of 
the historical conditions in which they came into being 
as a distinct category not easy. Generally, contemporary 
literature points out that Yezidism issued from the fusion 
of certain pre-Islamic belief systems which were still prac-
ticed in parts of the Kurdish highlands centuries after the 
coming of Islam, and of the teachings of Sheikh Adi ibn 
Musafir al-Umawi (1073 or 1078 to 1160 or 1163), a Sufi 
mystic and ascetic from the Beqaa valley in what is now 
Lebanon who settled among the Kurds in the early elev-
enth century. In the beginning, little distinguished the 
disciples of Sheikh Adi (Şêx Adî in Kurdish) from other 
orthodox Muslim orders. But, generation after genera-
tion, their religious practices reflected a clear resurgence 
of heterodox elements, consisting of innovations deroga-
tory towards Islamic dogma and of remaining pre-Islamic 
elements.
In turn, these customs and practices attracted the 
hostility upon the Yezidi of neighboring entities and 
ethno-religious communities, often encouraged therein 
by political and religious authorities. As guardians of 
Islamic orthodoxy, the latter indeed strongly feared the 
military strength of this renegade community, who, back 
then, comprised some of the most powerful Kurdish tribes 
from a military point of view.4 Set at the confines of the 
Ottoman and Safavid empires, some of these tribes did 
eventually convert to Sunni Islam in the run of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, at times when the rivalry 
between the Ottomans and Safavids created opportuni-
ties they could otherwise not capitalize on as infidels. This 
affected the remaining parts of the Yezidi community over 
the long term, in the sense that raids, expulsions and mas-
sacres became almost a constant in its existence. When 
these reached a new peak in the nineteenth century, sev-
eral Yezidi tribes were compelled to flee and took asylum 
in Russian Transcaucasia.
The Southern Caucasus as an ‘Identity 
Laboratory’
Likewise, the turn of the twentieth century, marked as it 
was by the first Armenian massacres, increasing pressure 
on other minorities in the Ottoman space and the disrup-
tions caused by the First World War, was equally nefari-
3 Philip G. Kreyenbroek et Khalil Jindy Rashow (2005), God and 
Sheikh Adi are Perfect—Sacred Poems and Religious Narratives 
from the Yezidi Tradition, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
4 Ibid.
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ous for the Yezidi. The postwar establishment of several 
nation-states in the Middle East added to this long process 
of disruption, since the borders which were established 
sustainably divided a community. Twice a minority, as 
Kurds and non-Muslims, they were now targeted, in Tur-
key as well as Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, by the 
central authorities’ nation-building which included pres-
sure to assimilate into the Turkish or Arab majority and 
at times relocation. Today, the emergence of the Islamic 
State has considerably perturbed the demography of the 
Yezidi in Iraq and Syria. More than eighteen months after 
the Sinjar massacres, the number of members of the com-
munity in both countries is unknown. An increasing num-
ber of Iraqi and Syrian Yezidi are leaving their countries of 
origin for Europe, either using the illegal migration routes 
or taking advantage of specific dispositions by certain EU 
countries towards them and their predicament. In spite 
of this, northern Iraq remains the core area of the Yezidi, 
with the great majority living in areas controlled by the 
Kurdish armed forces.
The Yezidi who took refuge in Russian Transcau-
casia knew a  quite different historic destiny. In the 
twentieth century, the USSR was probably the only state 
which officially recognized and promoted Kurdish iden-
tity. Approached under an exclusively secular angle, the 
recognition of the Kurds as a  ‘nationality’ within the 
Soviet order offered the opportunity to the Yezidi in the 
now Soviet Transcaucasus to play an active role in a pro-
cess of an explicitly Kurdish identity-building, appar-
ently discarding all confessional aspects. So, recognized 
as Kurds, the USSR’s Yezidi came at the heart of the con-
struction of a parallel Kurdish nationalism, taking advan-
tage of the possibilities set by the state to teach the Kurd-
ish language in schools and to promote secular Kurdish 
culture through state-supported newspapers, radio broad-
casts, literary productions and theatre, and the creation 
of a Soviet Kurdish intelligentsia, most of whom were 
based in Tbilisi and Yerevan.5 Hence for years, the USSR 
was a privileged and almost exclusive expression field of 
a Kurdish identity that was championed for the most part 
by people of Yezidi origin but who did not yet openly claim 
this particular part of their identity.
Mostly geared towards internal use, and strictly 
confined within the limits set by Soviet ideology and 
nationality policies, this identitary construction was 
rather inapt to influence the nationalist dynamics which 
emerged all along the twentieth century in the post-Otto-
man space and in Iran, despite the importance of the Kurd-
5 Lucina Jafarova, ‘Le théâtre kurde en URSS’, Études kurdes, №1, 
2/2000 : 47–58, Estelle Amy de la Bretèque, ‘Il y a quand même 
de l’espoir – Entretien avec Emerîk Serdar’, Etudes kurdes, №11, 
3/2012 : 103–108.
ish radio broadcasts on Radio Yerevan which could be 
heard over the border too. Inseparable from the Soviet 
societal project, this secular Kurdish culture would not 
survive the demise of the USSR itself. As a numerically 
weak minority and without a clearly-defined territory 
of its own, the Soviet Kurds, both those of Yezidi and 
Sunni Islamic background, did not expect much positive 
to come from the end of the Soviet state and its replace-
ment by successor states the titular majority nations of 
which went through a national awakening of their own. 
Despite many years of official discarding and suppression, 
the traditional religious cleavages had also not been erad-
icated from the collective consciousness.
The Karabakh War became a determining factor in 
this regard, in the sense that it dramatically affected the 
national unity of Transcaucasian Kurds.6 Since they were 
suspected by Armenian nationalists to tacitly support 
their coreligionists in Azerbaijan, Kurds of Muslim back-
ground who lived in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
were compelled to flee to Azerbaijan, where they face 
assimilation. For their part, the Kurds of Yezidi back-
ground who remained in Armenia increasingly felt the 
need to dissociate themselves from the Muslim Kurds 
who were, in Armenian nationalist narrative, also repre-
sented as active perpetrators of the Armenian massacres 
in the Ottoman empire in 1915. This evolution in identifi-
cation, initially a survival strategy, was enhanced by both 
the decay of the secular Kurdish intelligentsia who had 
been formed in the USSR and by the emergence, in the 
later Soviet period, of a more explicitly Yezidi elite who 
hoped for support of the Armenian state by clearly dis-
sociating itself and their followers from a wider Kurdish 
sphere which is for the most part Sunni Islamic.
Armenia as a Framework Space
Besides that, with the open return of religious identification 
and religious actors after the demise of the USSR, the Arme-
nian Apostolic Church became a cornerstone of Armenian 
national identity, just like the Georgian Orthodox Church 
became for national identity in the other area in the south-
ern Caucasus with a significant Yezidi population, Geor-
gia. Separated from their historical homeland and sacred 
places and with no sacred texts or confessional institutions, 
the formerly Soviet Yezidi lost a large part of their religious 
heritage and knowledge during the Soviet period. In the 
mid-term, this might have made part of them inclined to 
convert to Armenian Apostolic (or Georgian Orthodox) 
Christianity to elevate their social and communal status.7 
6 Estelle Amy de la Bretèque (2013), Paroles mélodisées. Récits 
épiques et lamentations chez les Yézidis d’Arménie, Paris : Clas-
siques Garnier.
7 Balci Bayram et Motika Raoul (dir) (2007), Religion et politique 
dans le Caucase post-soviétique, Paris: Maisoneuve et Larose.
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In such circumstances and in a reflex of identity survival, 
the Caucasian Yezidi eventually reinvigorated their own 
confessional identity which at the same time became the 
core of a new identity distinct from Kurdishness.
All this basically comes to the sense, to the raison 
d’ être, of the Ezdiki movement, which has been, since the 
1990s, the main champion of and the driving force behind 
the idea of a ‘Yezidi nation’. The movement, which first 
appeared in Armenia in the particular context of the Kara-
bakh War, deeply and durably influenced the Yezidi of the 
old USSR, not only in Armenia but also those in Geor-
gia, Russia (where many come from the southern Cauca-
sus) and in Western European countries (most of all Ger-
many) where a diaspora for Yezidi from the successor states 
of the USSR came into being from the 1990s onwards. 
This process of identity creation was first directed towards 
recognition of the community by the Armenian major-
ity and the Armenian state, first, by distinguishing one-
self clearly from the Sunni Muslim Kurds and second, 
by a new Yezidi commemorative discourse that is clearly 
analogous to the Armenian commemorative discourse.
Although the mother tongue of the Yezidi of the 
southern Caucasus is almost indistinguishable from the 
northern Kurdish Kurmanji dialects, it is now considered 
by the champions of the Yezidi nation and recognized by 
the Armenian authorities as a separate Caucasian Yezidi 
language: Ezdiki. In Armenia’s censuses and official sta-
tistics, ‘Yezidi’ and ‘Kurdish’ are two different categories. 
The institutional reforms of 2015 which guarantee repre-
sentation of non-Armenian communities in parliament 
also established these two distinct groups. Moreover, the 
Ezdiki movement and its different actors advance other 
national symbols like the conception of their own national 
flag. Its positions are now being spread on the internet and 
through online social networks, helped by the fact that 
the younger generations, those born in the late 1980s and 
in the 1990s, have no other horizon that that set by their 
confessional identity and have not been acculturated in 
an environment which valorizes Kurdishness.
The stakes are now to create a Yezidi identity capable 
of being recognized as legitimate by the Armenian major-
ity. Neglected but not completely suppressed during the 
Soviet era, Yezidi religious practice is being rebuilt from 
scratch, not on the basis of the rites and institutions which 
are still practiced and functioning in northern Iraq, but, 
rather, using criteria which are applied to define a  legit-
imate religion in the Armenian and Georgian contexts. 
One way in which this comes forward is the plan to build 
a new ‘temple’ in the locality of Aknalich in Armenia, 
whereas in fact, the notion of temples is absent in Yezidi 
tradition. To be built on the site of a more modest struc-
ture from 2012, the edifice, according to the architectural 
plans, will come to have some of the structural elements 
of an Armenian church and will be decorated with Yezidi 
symbolism. The site is also to become a place of pilgrimage. 
Besides the obvious religious functions, the compound is 
also to host a TV station, a cultural center and a library, 
inspired by a similar site which was inaugurated in Tbilisi 
in the summer of 2015.
From a Yezidi Nation…
This identity dynamic is also fully integrated into the ties 
and interaction between the Caucasian Yezidi, most of 
all the protagonists of the Ezdiki movement, and Iraqi 
Kurdistan and its Yezidi population. The collapse of the 
USSR and later of Baathist Iraq led to a relative opening 
of borders and communication ties that facilitated contact 
between the Yezidi of the Caucasus and those of Iraq that 
were previously near-impossible. The internet and satellite 
networks allow Caucasus Yezidi to remain informed about 
the Iraqi Yezidis’ situation and predicaments, including 
instances of occasional violence that happened even before 
the Sinjar tragedy. The latter events that indeed started 
to occur from the early 2000s onward, reportedly involv-
ing harassment by Kurdish nationalists that the Ezdiki 
activists described as akin to Sunni fundamentalists. They 
feed a process of community story-telling on the internet 
and social media. Note that the leading advocates of the 
Ezdiki movement, the majority of whom reside in Yere-
van, tend to borrow certain aspects of the Armenian com-
memorative discourse, using explicitly the word ‘genocide’ 
when referring to the series of car bomb attacks by Islamic 
militants on Yezidi near Mosul in summer 2007.
The massacre of Sinjar, of course, invigorated this 
dynamic, as well as the reappropriation of the events in the 
Middle East for aims proper to the internal Armenian con-
text. As a matter of fact, the proximity in time of the Sinjar 
massacre of summer 2014 and the centennial of the Arme-
nian genocide in spring 2015, created ample opportunity for 
the protagonists of the Yezidi cause to fully use the logics of 
mimicry. This became apparent, inter alia, in the presence 
of Yezidi religious dignitaries from Iraq at the centennial 
memorial service in Yerevan. The now systematic use of the 
term ‘genocide’ to designate the Sinjar events is another illus-
trating example. This construction of commemorative foot-
bridges and constant references to common enemies gained 
new momentum with the ever-frequent evocation of the fig-
ure of Jehangir Aga, a Yezidi chieftain who fought alongside 
the Armenians against the Turkish armed forces in 1918.
This will to strengthen historical resonances is even more 
effective now that Armenian opinion and the Armenians 
state are being exposed to the events in the Middle East and 
more specifically in Syria through the situation of the eth-
nic Armenians of Syria, many of whom descend from sur-
vivors of the massacres in the Ottoman empire who re-set-
tled in Aleppo, Damascus and other places in Syria under 
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the French mandate. In Armenia and in the Armenian dia-
spora, the Syrian War, the Islamic State and other militant 
Islamic outfits are perceived to be existential threats to the 
Armenians in a similar way as the Turkish massacres of 1915 
were. Since 2012, there has been a influx of Armenian refu-
gees from Aleppo and other places to the Caucasian country.
… to De-Territorialized Yezidism?
Nonetheless, the field on which the Yazidi identity con-
struction and the ‘Armenian(ized) narrative’ of the Yezidi 
identity may grow and globalize is the diaspora. The Sinjar 
tragedy has indeed triggered a wave of migration of Iraqi 
Yezidis to Western Europe. Despite the recapture of Sin-
jar by Kurdish and Yezidi militias in autumn 2015, there 
is actually little hope and support among the Yezidi left 
to build a future in Iraq or in any Islamic country for that 
matter. Some notability do appeal for it because of politi-
cal opportunism. If the poorer strata have no option but to 
stay for lack of means to emigrate, those whose financial 
resources permit them to do so predominantly take the 
road into exile. In Iraq, the trauma of Sinjar globally con-
tributes to the redefinition of a Yezidi identity as opposed 
to Islam and therefore to the Kurdishness which tends 
to be associated with it. The new identity of the Yezidi 
migrants who arrived in Europe from Iraq thus tend to 
be in resonance with that which was developed and prac-
ticed by the Yezidi communities who settled there earlier, 
adn who were mainly Caucasian Yezidi influenced by the 
‘Armenian(ised) version’ of the Yezidi identity.
After Sinjar, one can observe a clear activization of 
actors of the second generation who maintain and com-
plete this identity discourse. They either contribute to 
it individually through publications and comments on 
social networks (in German, English, French, Russian 
and Kurdish) or collectively, in associations that provide 
assistance to Yezidi refugees and at the same time func-
tion as platforms for the idea of a Yezidi nation differ-
ent from the Kurdish one. These evolutions clearly affect 
Yezidi migrants in Western Europe and their families who 
stayed behind but communicate with each other using the 
same social media. Besides, the increasing tensions with 
regard to Islam and Muslims and to the refugee crisis in 
Europe encourage Yezidi actors to emphasize in an ever 
more structured way that they have an identity certainly 
connected to the Middle East but radically opposed to 
Islam. This dynamic contains legitimation strategies vis-
à-vis the majorities and authorities of the European host 
countries that clearly resemble those used in the southern 
Caucasus in the 1990s.
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Sunni and Shia Muslims in Georgia: a Societal Margin in Motion?
Inga Popovaite, Iowa City
Abstract
This article offers a concise overview of the different Muslim groups in Georgia, and discusses their identity 
issues and socioeconomic situation as well as the current actions of the state directed towards their integra-
tion. The Muslim communities in Georgia, which consist primarily of Azeri, Adjarians and Kist, generally 
form a marginal group in society since they are not perceived to be full members of the Georgian nation 
due to their confessional background and, in case of Azeri and Kist, linguistic factors. A large majority of 
the Muslims in Georgia also live in rural regions where the overall economic and social predicament often 
negatively differ from that in the majority culture and in urban areas. Hence the question is whether spe-
cific socioeconomic conditions and identity issues and alienation contribute to forms of radicalization among 
Georgia’s Muslim communities or whether there are dynamics of integration in Georgian society.
Georgia’s Muslims: a Social Topography
Georgia is a country with a predominant Christian pop-
ulation. As can be seen in the annex of this issue, roughly 
83 percent of the population of Georgia considers them-
selves followers of the autocephalous Georgian Ortho-
dox Church, which is a key element of Georgian national 
identity. If we add the near 3.9 percent adherents of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, and the followers of Arme-
nian and Georgian Catholicism, Greek Orthodoxy and 
the dozen or so of Evangelical, Protestant and Pentecostal 
denominations that are active in the country, the Chris-
tian majority comes at about ninety percent. Near one-
tenth of the population identify themselves as Muslims, 
of which roughly a bit more than half are culturally and 
traditionally Sunni and the rest Shia. Ethnically, socially 
and ideologically, though, they form an all but homoge-
nous community.
The largest Muslim group in the country are ethnic 
Azeri or Azerbaijani. Currently, around 284,000 Tur-
kic Azeri live in Georgia, with a clear concentration in 
the rural south-eastern regions of Kvemo Kartli (some 
226,000) and Kakheti (33,600) which border Azerbaijan 
and Dagestan. A sizeable community, perhaps as large as 
18,000, also lives in the capital Tbilisi. Though predomi-
nantly of Shia tradition, some authors claim that there is 
a sizeable Sunni minority of up to one-third among them. 
In everyday life and practice, though, the line between 
both is not clear-cut and mosques serving both denomina-
tions are common. At the country’s other end on the Black 
Sea, in the autonomous republic of Adjara, lives most of 
Georgia’s second-largest Muslim community, Sunni Mus-
lims of Georgian ethnicity and language.1 Adjara, whose 
center is the city of Batumi, used to be a part of the Otto-
man empire from 1614 until the Ottoman-Russian War 
of 1877–78, which explains the presence of an Islamized 
1 Muslims of Georgian ethnicity and language will be further 
referred to as Adjarians.
Georgian group there. In the USSR, it was, along with the 
Birobijan Jewish autonomy in the Far East, one of the two 
territorial-administrative units specifically designed for 
a confessionally-defined community in a borderland area.
According to the latest official census data, about one-
third of the region’s population consider themselves Sunni 
Muslims, compared to near two-thirds adherents of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church. The majority of the Sunni 
Adjarians are generally living in rural, mountainous part 
of the area with a concentration around Khulo. There are 
also Adjarian communities in Batumi and Tbilisi. Fur-
thermore, the Pankisi valley in the north-eastern part 
of Kakheti, is home to a reportedly 8,110-strong Kist 
community. The Kist, who are a Chechen sub-group, are 
mostly Sunni although a few villages are Orthodox Chris-
tian. Their traditional folk Sufism incorporated not a few 
animist and Christian elements. Over the last fifteen years, 
however, under the influence of movement and dynamics 
in neighboring Chechnya and Dagestan, Salafi Sunnism 
gathered a following among the younger segments of the 
Kist population. Finally, other Muslim groups in the coun-
try include about 2,000 Caucasian Avars who live in three 
villages in Kakheti, and Meskhetian Turks, who histor-
ically lived in Samtskhe-Javakheti but were deported to 
the Uzbek SSR under Stalinist rule before small numbers 
returned to Georgia after 1989–91. However, this article 
will not specifically elaborate on these latter groups, con-
centrating instead on the Azer(baijan)i, Adjarians and 
Kist.
Exclusion from the National Imaginary
One of the biggest challenges to a Muslim living in Geor-
gia is the perception of Georgian Orthodox Christianity 
as a fundament of Georgian national identity. In other 
words, only members of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
are seen by many among the grassroots, as belonging to 
the Georgian nation. The Georgian Orthodox Church 
is the most trusted public institution with 82 percent 
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of the country’s population trusting it, and has a strong 
influence in political and public discourse.2 Also Geor-
gian and international academics argue that the two fol-
lowing aspects are emphasized in the national Georgian 
narrative: Georgian language and Orthodox Christian-
ity. They are perceived as the corner stones of Georgian 
culture and distinct national identity. By preserving their 
language and religion throughout the turmoil of history 
and wars with neighboring powers, Georgians believe to 
have preserved their national selves as well. Thus, at least 
in the eye of the majority, ethnic minority Muslims, in 
the first place Azeri and Kists, lack both crucial elements 
of Georgian identity since the Georgian language is not 
their native tongue and since they do not belong to the 
Georgian Orthodox Church.
The Azeri identity is traditionally mostly based on 
their distinct Turkic ethnicity and language more than 
on religion. However, in line with what is happening in 
Azerbaijan itself, both Shia and Sunni Islam are experi-
encing revival among the minority’s younger segments. 
Nowadays, more younger that aged people are attending 
Friday prayers in the main mosque in Tbilisi as well as in 
mosques in the province, just like increasing numbers are 
conducting the Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca) and pil-
grimages to Shia religious sites in Iran and Iraq. In addi-
tion, similar to what happens among the Kist in Pan-
kisi, there are estimates that around 20 percent among 
the 15–35 age bracket of the Azeri population of Kvemo 
Kartli are at least influenced by Salafism. The reported 
rise in religiosity among Azeri goes hand in hand with 
the increase in cross-border religious activity during the 
past decade or so. In the 1990s, a lot of missionaries from 
Iran made their way to Georgia’s Azeri-populated areas 
and gave an opportunity to local youth to study in reli-
gious centers in Iran.
Students from Georgia who attended Islamic insti-
tutions abroad later returned, often armed with religious 
knowledge superior to that of the traditional religious lead-
ers and elders, to their communities and established reli-
gious foundations, run by ethnic Azeri but often funded 
by foundations form Iran, Iraq and Shia and Sunni net-
works from Turkey. Kist, on the other hand, have always 
perceiving Islam to be a more integral part of their culture 
and society. There are now fault lines, though, between 
older and younger generations because the older genera-
tion is more attached to traditional Sufism while Salafi 
influence is clearly present among part of the young. An 
important vector of Salafism were refugees fleeing the 
Chechen Wars of 1994–96 and 1999–2000. Kist people 
claim that they have two homelands: Chechnya, which 
they see as the core area of their language and much of 
2 CRRC Online Data Analysis—Caucasus Barometer, 2013
their culture and customs, and Georgia, their actual home-
land where they developed a specific Kist identity. In con-
trast to Azeri, Kists have few problems with the Georgian 
language in the sense that most inhabitants from Pankisi 
are bilingual or trilingual, using the local Chechen-based 
dialect to converse among themselves and Georgian and 
Russian for talking to officials or outsiders. In addition, 
their family names usually have Georgian suffixes like 
-shvili and -adze.
Adjarians are in a more peculiar situation. They are 
not complete ‘others’ since they always had Georgian as 
their mother tongue, yet not complete ‘ours’ because they 
are not Christians. They are seen as ‘incomplete selves’. 
Importantly, Adjarian Islam is generally perceived to be in 
retreat, especially in Batumi and in the lowlands, because 
of a trend among (parts of) this population groups to con-
vert, or, as some would say, revert, to Georgian Ortho-
doxy which is not only perceived to be the religion of 
their forefathers before the Ottoman era, but also a nec-
essary prerequisite to fully belong to the Georgian nation 
and to obtain adequate social-economic status. It results 
in younger, socially mobile and better educated middle 
class and urban dwellers opting for Christianity or at least 
diminishing their Muslim identity, and in Islam becom-
ing more concentrated in rural mountainous areas among 
more traditional population.
Finally, in recent years, Georgian and international 
media as well as former president Mikheil Saakashvili 
reported that up to ‘several hundreds’ young Georgian 
citizens from the main Muslim communities—Adjari-
ans, Azeri and Kist—left the country to join the ranks 
of Daesh (Islamic State) in Syria. Although the actual 
proportions of this phenomenon are subject to specula-
tion if not rabble-rousing by opinion makers and interest 
groups, it did strengthen the perception of the presence 
of the ‘other’ in the core areas of Georgian national iden-
tity. Mainstream Muslim leaders in Georgia tend to advo-
cate interfaith solidarity and condemn radical Islamists, 
but there is a plethora of reasons why a number of Mus-
lims in Georgia are susceptible to adopt non-traditional 
religious practices and currents if not religious radical-
ism. The lack of socioeconomic opportunities in the rural 
regions is certainly one, yet a sense of alienation from the 
Georgian majority and a search for their identity at times 
of stark social change are certainly as important.
The Institutional Inequalities
In Georgia, religious freedom is protected by the consti-
tution and other laws and policies. At the same time, the 
constitutional agreement between the Georgian Ortho-
dox Church and the state stresses the unique status of the 
Church and gives it special rights and a privileged partner-
ship not granted to other religious denominations, includ-
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ing to those under the official Administration of Geor-
gian Muslims. This agreement, among other rights, allows 
the Church to advise the government in the sphere of 
education (although the parliament needs to adopt leg-
islation to implement this) and gives it exclusive rights 
to staff the military chaplaincy. In addition to that, the 
Church has a long history of state funding. Between 2002 
and 2015, for instance, it received 250 million lari (then 
around $105 million) or an average of 19.2 million lari per 
year, from the state budget. In comparison, the Admin-
istration of Georgian Muslims, established in 2011, just 
recently started receiving public funds, along with other 
traditional religious minorities like Catholics, Armenian 
Apostolics and Jews.3 For 2014–15, the government prom-
ised to allocate 3.3 million lari (about $1.38 million) or 
an annual 1.65 million lari, to the institution.
Although Muslims thus started to get funding from 
the state, the main funding and support for their religious 
activities and infrastructure comes from private as well 
as and semi-official foundation and sources form abroad. 
A number of Sunni mosques in Adjara are thus financed 
from Turkey (Liles, 2012), while Shia foundations from 
Turkey, Iran, Iraqi and individual Shia leaders like al-Sis-
tani support religious organizations in the Shia Azeri com-
munity. Some Salafi groups who are active among the Kist 
in Pankisi are believed to be sponsored by charities from 
the Arab Gulf and by Salafi Chechen networks in Russia. 
Such real and perceived external support, and the agen-
das embedded in it, adds to a climate of suspicion creating 
extra tension and distrust for religious minorities among 
the country’s Christian majority. It should be noted here 
that Georgian law separates religious and secular edu-
cation. Religious classes can take place only after school 
hours and cannot be controlled by the authority or teach-
ers of a given public school. At the same time, outside 
instructors, for example priests, cannot regularly attend 
or direct students’ clubs or any extracurricular activities at 
public schools. However, in practice, there is a strong trace 
of religious agenda in secular curriculum, especially in his-
tory classes, in which a lot of attention is being devoted to 
the historical role of the Georgian Orthodox Church as 
the preserver of Georgian national identity against neigh-
boring Islamic empires and entities like the Ottomans, 
Persia and the southern Caspian khanates.
The Social-Economic Predicament(s)
As mentioned above, the Azeri form the largest Muslim 
group in Georgia. According to the most recent census, 
3 Established under the Saakashvili administration, the AGM was 
viewed by part of the respective Muslim communities to be an 
attempt to exercise control over in-group affairs in the Muslim 
community.
the one of 2002, there were over 284,000 ethnic Azeri 
in Georgia. This is an 8 percent drop from the more than 
307,000 in 1989, which can be attributed to emigration 
to Turkey and Azerbaijan due to the radical change in 
socials and economic conditions and the political tur-
moil and armed conflict after the demise of the USSR. 
Azeris mostly live in rural areas and mainly rely on agri-
culture, both growing for themselves and for selling, to 
support themselves. Around half of the Azeri rural house-
holds indicated that they live in poverty, with 46.4 per-
cent of ethnic Azeri families in Kvemo Kartli spending 
more than 70 percent of their income on food as com-
pared to 25.3 percent of ethnic Georgian families. A rep-
resentative study of socioeconomic situation and attitudes 
among the population in Kvemo Kartli, a region where 
Azeri form 36.8 percent of the population, revealed that 
there is a substantial lack of knowledge of Georgian lan-
guage among members of this minority.4
Azeri tend to live in close-knit communities, predom-
inantly Azeri villages, and use the Turkic Azeri language 
instead of the Ibero-Caucasian Georgian language for 
intergroup communication and Russian for interethnic 
communication. Data showed that 78.3 percent of eth-
nic Azeri in Kvemo Kartli do not speak Georgian, which 
in turn alienates them from the labor market, distances 
them from ethnic Georgians and prevents them from get-
ting enough information about various development proj-
ects and support structures implemented in this region. In 
addition, Azeri tend to be more disengaged from local pol-
itics that their Georgian counterparts. However, the same 
data suggest that ethnic Azeri understand the necessity 
of knowing Georgian, and respondents did not indicate 
any discrimination regarding their access to education or 
serious obstacles that would obstruct them from learning 
Georgian. At the same time, Azeri children show a some-
what lower involvement in education than their ethnic 
majority counterparts: 6.6 percent of Azeri children are 
not enrolled in school, compared to 2.5 percent Georgian 
children in the same region. In rural municipalities where 
Azeri constitute the majority like Marneuli, Tsalka, Dma-
nisi and Bolnisi, named reasons for students dropping out 
of school were their own choice due to lack of desire to 
study, no school in the vicinity, necessity to work, prob-
lems with documentation, lack of money for school sup-
plies, and early marriages.
Although under-age marriage does occurs among 
Georgia’s majority culture too, especially in rural areas—
according to the UN Population Fund, up to 17 percent 
4 Iago Kachkachishvili, Nino Korinteli, Teona Mataradze, and 
Mamuka Nadareishvili ( 2012). Study of social and economic con-
ditions and attitudes of Kvemo Kartli population. Tbilisi: Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC-DEZA).
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of women in Georgia were married before they turned 
185—there seem to be a higher prevalence among high-
land Adjarians and among Azeri in Kvemo Kartli than 
in other parts of Georgia. In Pankisi also, a number of 
social factors impede social mobility. Although, as men-
tioned above, fluency or at least workable knowledge of 
the Georgian language is higher among Kist people than 
among Azeri, the socioeconomic conditions in Pankisi 
are also rather difficult. Local non-governmental orga-
nizations, for example, estimate that only one-tenth of 
the population in Pankisi is employed officially, although 
this of course does not exclude lots of activity and some-
times opportunities in the informal economy. Approxi-
mately half of the population is aged 15–25 though, and 
against a background of limited opportunity in educa-
tion and formal employment in Pankisi itself, it remains 
to be seen how people will cope. Finally, the ethnic Geor-
gian Muslims from upper Adjara share a similar socioeco-
nomic predicament with the two above-mentioned groups. 
The main sources of income are paid labor in the service 
industry, construction and the hospitality industry, agri-
culture and pensions. Reportedly, around one-third of the 
rural population in Adjara lived below the poverty line of 
$2 per day in 2006–2007. Although this has shifted, a lot 
of households are still precarious.
Current Trends
This concise overview of the Muslim populations in Geor-
gia touched upon different issues that this religious minor-
ity faces in this predominantly Christian country and 
society. Yet, and this is important, it is false to conclude 
that the situation is deadlocked and not changing for the 
better. To start with, Muslims already have state-level 
representation via the Administration of Georgian Mus-
lims, established in 2011. In addition, the current state 
administration has created a new institution, the State 
Agency for Religious Issues, whose main goal is to ensure 
religious freedom and non-discrimination in the coun-
try. However, this agency has not gained public promi-
nence yet. Second, Georgia is trying to implement bet-
ter state language teaching programs in ethnic minority 
regions, including the Azeri villages in Kvemo Karli and 
Kakheti, by training teachers to teach Georgian as a sec-
ond language. Similarly, affirmative action programs are 
applied for students with ethnic minority background 
who apply to universities in Georgia. Such institutional 
approach has a potential to improve Azeri integration into 
Georgian society. No such programs are being set up or 
planned for the Kist community though.
Third, the parliament of Georgia adopted law changes 
in 2015, which stipulate that underage marriage is a crim-
inal offence. In addition, numerous grassroots organiza-
tions are taking upon themselves to educate adolescents 
about damages of underage marriages for women. One of 
the biggest current challenges though are posed by real 
and perceived radicalization trends among Muslims in 
Georgia. This issue is not new. In 2002–03, for example, 
the Pankisi gorge attracted international attention when 
it was reported to be a hideout for alleged al-Qaeda mil-
itants and armed Chechen Salafi groups. More recently, 
a number of Georgians citizens have reported to have 
joined Daesh in Syria. The exact numbers are unknown, 
but the media speculates that it is under 100 people. In 
both chapters, part of the commotion was and is artificial. 
In any case, the state has strengthened its antiterrorism 
laws, making it illegal to join paramilitary organizations 
abroad. There is still a lack, however, of community-driven 
action and bottom-up approach, such as moderate Islamic 
teaching by credible actors or the creation of social and 
economic opportunities for adolescents. Finally, the prev-
alence of the Georgian Orthodox Church discourse in 
politics, media and education, and a religiously-infused 
national narrative fuse religion and the state together and 
keep Muslims (and other religious minorities) in Georgia 
in the margins of the nation. As a very influential actor, 
the Church should also adopt a more inclusive narrative 
and work on social inclusion of this religious minority 
into a greater society.
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DOCUMENTATION
The Confessional Demography of the Southern Caucasus
Graphics prepared by Bruno De Cordier and Inga Popovaite on the basis of data from the population censuses of Azer-
baijan of 2009, of Georgia of 2002 (the full results of Georgia’s 2014 population census are only expected in mid-2016, 
that is after this issue goes to press) and of Armenia of 2011, the 2008 report on religious movements in Georgia by the 
Public Defender’s Office, and Pew Research Centre—Religion and Public Life. Due to the differing methodologies of 
the respective sources, at times conflicting figures and differences in figures, and the lack of clarity on the distribution 
between Shia and Sunni, the data are approximate. They also reflect the religious (self-)identification of the population, 
but not the actual religious practice. 
Figure 1: Azerbaijan
5,625,573 (62.8%)
3,029,158 (33.4%)
117,000 (1.3%)
120,300 (1.34%)*
9,900 (0.11%)
3,800 (0.04%)
3,000 (0.03%)
28,000 (0.3%)
8,700 (0.1%)
52,169 (0.58%)
Shia Islam
Sunni Islam
Russian Orthodox Christianity
Armenian Apostolic Christianity
Georgian Orthodox Christianity
Udi-Albanian Christianity
Molokans
Evangelicals, Protestantism and Pentecostalism
Judaism
Others or no religion
*Concentrated in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh
Figure 2: Georgia*
* Without Abkhazia and South Ossetia
3,666,233 (82.7%)
204,108 (4.6%)
229,676 (5.2%)
34,727 (0.78%)
3,500 (0.078%)
15,166 (0.34%)
171,139 (3.86%)
29,600 (0.66%)
3,541 (0.075%)
18,329 (0.67%)
3,299 (0.07%)
15,003 (0.33%)
28,631 (0.64%)
Georgian Orthodox Christianity
Shia Islam
Sunni Islam
Armenian and Georgian Catholicism
Molokans and Dukhobors
Greek Orthodox Christianity
Armenian Apostolic Christianity
Evangelicals, Protestantism and Pentecostalism
Judaism
Yezidism
Assyrian Christianity
Other
No religion
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Figure 3: Armenia
2,796,519 (92.6%)
13,843 (0.46%)
7,532 (0.25%)
25,204 (0.83%)
2,872 (0.13%)
37,975 (1.26%)
13,322 (0.44%)
121,587  (4.03%)
Armenian Apostolic Christianity
Armenian Catholic Christianity
Russian Orthodox Christianity
Yezidism*
Molokans
Evangelicals, Protestantism and Pentecostalism
Other
No religion
* Number of  citizens of Armenia declaring to follow or identify with the Yezidi faith (called ‘Sharfadinism’ in the census) as opposed to 
‘ethnic Yezidi’, some of whom declared to follow Armenian Apostolic Christianity or Protestantism.
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